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Abstract We report the results of a new survey on entrepreneurship in Brazil. In 
September 2006, we interviewed 400 entrepreneurs and 550 non-entrepreneurs of the 
same age, gender, education and location in 7 Brazilian cities. The data are used to test 
three competing hypotheses on entrepreneurship: the role of economic and legal 
institutions (security of property rights; access to credit); the role of sociological 
characteristics (family background, social networks); and the role of individual features 
(attitude towards risk, I.Q., self-confidence) in becoming an entrepreneur. In line with our 
previous research in China and Russia, we find that sociological characteristics have the 
strongest influence on becoming an entrepreneur. In contrast, success as an entrepreneur 
is primarily determined by the individual’s smartness and higher education in the family. 
Entrepreneurs are not more self-confident than non-entrepreneurs; and overconfidence is 
bad for business success. 
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Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is a relatively underdeveloped research topic. A growing body of 
research emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and the development of a vibrant small and 
medium enterprise sector in the process of economic development (World Bank, 2003).  
Understanding the factors that enable and hinder entrepreneurial activities is thus at the 
heart of this research agenda. The Schumpeterian approach to growth (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1997) also advances the view that entrepreneurial dynamism is the key to 
innovation and growth. Schumpeter (1911) discussed the role of the entrepreneur in the 
process of economic development at length.  He saw the entrepreneur as a creative, 
driven individual who finds “new combinations of [factors] of production” to develop a 
new product, corner a new market, or design a new technology. Schumpeter speculates 
about the psyche of the archetypal entrepreneur: he is motivated by a “dream to find a 
private kingdom, or dynasty… [driven by] the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior 
to others, to succeed for the sake of… success itself.” 
 
There are three distinct perspectives on entrepreneurship in the social sciences.  The first 
is the institutional perspective emphasized by economists and political scientists. This 
perspective focuses on the role of economic and legal institutions in fostering or 
restricting entrepreneurship. These have to do with credit constraints (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993), the security of property rights (Besley, 1995; Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; McMillan and Woodruff, 2001; Roland, 2000, Che and Qian, 1998, 
Djankov et al., 2003; Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000), and the burden of regulations (De 
Soto, 2000; Djankov et al., 2002; Mullanathan and Schnabl, 2007; Amit et al, 2007).  
 
The second perspective focuses on the sociological variables that are shaping 
entrepreneurship.  Sociologists have long emphasized the role of values (Cochran, 1971) 
and social networks (Young, 1971) in promoting or discouraging entrepreneurial 
activities. Social networks may work through a variety of channels, such as family, 
relatives, friends, or social groups in general. Economists have recently studied the role 
of culture in promoting entrepreneurship (Iyer and Schoar, 2007) 
 
The third perspective on entrepreneurship emphasizes individual characteristics of 
entrepreneurs.  For example, psychologists have hypothesized about the psychological 
traits associated with entrepreneurs – such as a personal need for achievement 
(McClellan, 1961), belief in the effect of personal effort on outcomes (McGhee and 
Crandall, 1968; Lao, 1970), attitudes towards risk, and individual self-confidence (Liles, 
1974).  Personal characteristics of entrepreneurs is also a major theme of Lazear (2002), 
who used the survey data of Stanford University MBA graduates and found that those 
with a higher number of jobs and shorter job tenures before graduate school were most 
likely to become entrepreneurs afterwards. He concludes that individuals who become 
entrepreneurs have a special ability to acquire general skills, which they then apply to 
their own businesses. 
 
The current project studies entrepreneurship from these three perspectives using a new 
data set in Brazil. Our broader research agenda is to conduct surveys in Brazil, Russia, 
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India and China. There are two reasons why we chose to study entrepreneurship in these 
countries. First, they are the largest emerging economies in the world.  Second, because 
these are federal countries, we are able to exploit substantial regional variation in 
institutions and culture within those countries.  
 
In this paper we report the findings from a survey conducted in Brazil in September 2006. 
The most striking result, which we also found in Russia and China (Djankov et al. 2005, 
2006a, 2006b), is that entrepreneurs have many more entrepreneurs among their relatives 
(parents, aunts, uncles, siblings, cousins) and also among their childhood friends. There is 
a strong effect of the social environment on the choice to become an entrepreneur. We are 
able to provide some causal evidence of this, suing the size of the father’s family as an 
instrument. However, social network effects do not play a significant role in determining 
success once the business starts operations. Instead, we find that smartness and the 
human capital of the father are the most important explanatory variables. Interestingly, 
we find no evidence that entrepreneurs are more self-confident than non entrepreneurs. 
Finally, we find that overconfidence is bad for success in business. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
provides analysis on who becomes an entrepreneur. Section 4 analyzes the factors for 
being a successful entrepreneur. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Data 
We  surveyed a random sample of about 400 entrepreneurs – 100 in Sao Paulo and 50 in 
Curitiba and Londrina in the Sul region; Salvador and Feira de Santana in the Nordeste 
region; and Brazilia and Goiania in the Centro Oeste region. To capture regional 
heterogeneity in Brazil, the regions were selected to maximize the cross-regions variation 
in the business climate. We defined entrepreneur as an owner-manager of a business with 
five or more employees because we wanted to make sure that individuals whom we call 
entrepreneurs are not simply self-employed.  
 
After completing the surveys of entrepreneurs, we conducted a survey of about 550 non-
entrepreneurs in the same cities using a near-identical survey. We defined non-
entrepreneurs as individuals who are not working for their own business. 80% of 
respondents in the non-entrepreneur sample were chosen randomly conditional on 
matching the age, gender and educational attainment of entrepreneurs from the respective 
entrepreneur surveys, and 20% were chosen at random. In order to weigh correctly the 
data, we used the Brazilian census to determine the proportion of entrepreneurs in the 
cities we surveyed. In all the empirical analysis, the observations are weighted with 
weights equal to the inverse of the probability for a particular respondent (entrepreneur or 
non-entrepreneur) to get into our sample. The weights reflect differences in 
entrepreneurship, age, gender, and education across cities in the population, as well as 
city size.  
 
Personal characteristics 
We first provide characteristics from our entrepreneurs’ sample and compare them to non 
entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs (people who once ran a business but closed it 
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down). All the means in Table 1 are conditional on age, gender and education. Brazilian 
entrepreneurs tend to come more from rural areas (24% against 9% for non 
entrepreneurs) and are less likely to have been born in a city. They have lived in more 
localities than non entrepreneurs (Table 1a). However, failed entrepreneurs have lived in 
even more localities than entrepreneurs. A similar pattern can be found for the number of 
professional activities. They are more likely to be protestant (15% against 9 % for non 
entrepreneurs) which is intriguing in an overwhelmingly catholic country. They are more 
likely to be married and less likely to be overweight.  Entrepreneurs are roughly one cm 
taller than non entrepreneurs in our sample. Failed entrepreneurs are in less good health 
than entrepreneurs or non entrepreneurs.  
 
In terms of education, Brazilian entrepreneurs do not report that they were more often 
among the top 10 % in school than non-entrepreneurs. Those who went to university 
were even less likely to report that they were among the top 10 %. However, failed 
entrepreneurs were roughly 50 percent less likely to have been among the top 10% 
compared to entrepreneurs.  
 
Interestingly, Brazilian entrepreneurs do not exhibit more risk-loving attitudes than non 
entrepreneurs. They are even less likely than non entrepreneurs to take risky gambles on 
their income. However, entrepreneurs are somewhat more ready to take a risky gamble 
compared to failed entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs appear also more patient than non 
entrepreneurs. When asked what minimum return they would require one month later 
after having invested $100 today, we found that the annual computed average discount 
rate was lower among entrepreneurs than among non entrepreneurs (18% against 24%). 
We asked similarly a question about hyperbolic discount rate (what return between $100 
a year from now and one month later) and found that the percentage of respondents with 
hyperbolic discount rate was somewhat lower among non entrepreneurs. More than half 
appeared to have hyperbolic discounting! 
 
We performed a test of cognitive ability based on short term recall and found that 
entrepreneurs did significantly better than non entrepreneurs. We used the answers to 
those questions to measure overconfidence or under-confidence. We asked respondents to 
rate themselves on the cognitive score. Respondents who stated that their answers were 
above average but were in reality below average were rated as overconfident whereas 
those who rated themselves as below average but were in reality above average were 
rates as under-confident. Looking at the conditional means we did not find here any 
significant differences between entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs. 
 
We next asked in our survey whether people would decide to retire if they received a 
windfall income equal to 100 times GDP per capita and 500 times GDP per capita (Table 
1b). Entrepreneurs were significantly less ready to retire if they received a windfall 
income of 100 times GDP per capita (11% compared to 35% for non entrepreneurs). 
However, for 500 times GDP per capita there was no significant difference between the 
remaining entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs (we tried even-larger differences and 
found the same result). Among the reasons for not willing to retire, no significant 
difference was observed between entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs. The main reason 
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for not wanting to retire is the love of one’s job. This motive is twice as high among 
entrepreneurs as among failed entrepreneurs whose main motive is greed. 
 
Various questions were asked about social values to determine whether there are sharp 
differences between the values held by entrepreneurs compared to non entrepreneurs. The 
answer is no. Brazilian entrepreneurs put a significant higher value on the education of 
children than non entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs value the importance of work 
significantly less than entrepreneurs. They value friendship significantly more. Such 
differences could be due to differences in values but they might also reflect a “cognitive 
dissonance” response to failure.  
 
Entrepreneurs are significantly less accepting of avoiding payment for public 
transportation but are more accepting the idea of paying bribes to avoid regulations. 
However, the numbers are small (9% compared to 0%). In general, the responses show a 
low tolerance for corruption.  
 
Responses to questions about trust revealed that entrepreneurs show more trust than non 
entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs (Table 1c). This is true for generalized trust, trust 
in businessmen, subordinates and other townsmen but there is no significant difference 
for trust in the different levels of government. 
 
Sociological characteristics 
The parents of entrepreneurs are not more highly educated than non entrepreneurs but the 
mothers of failed entrepreneurs were less highly educated than the mothers of 
entrepreneurs (Table 1d). The parents of entrepreneurs were however more often 
managers working with subordinates and less likely to be a worker. The difference is 
quite strong. In our entrepreneur sample 54% of fathers and 27% of mothers were 
directors or senior managers compared respectively to 18% and 3% for non 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs come more often from wealthier families than non-
entrepreneurs.  
 
A striking characteristic which we also found in Russia and China is that entrepreneurs 
are much more likely to have friends and family entrepreneurs. In our Brazil sample, 81% 
of entrepreneurs have relatives who are businessmen, compared to 55 % among non 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs report also more often to have relatives who are self-
employed or who have a business with 5 or more employees. The average number of 
entrepreneurs in entrepreneur families is also significantly larger than among non 
entrepreneur families. We also asked people in the survey to remember their 5 best 
friends from school and then asked who became an entrepreneur. The difference is also 
striking here. We found that 70% of entrepreneurs had school friends who became 
entrepreneurs compared to 48% for non entrepreneurs. The same question about 
university friends yielded a positive answer with 78% of entrepreneurs compared to 33 % 
for non entrepreneurs. However, few report that the experience of their school or 
university friends affected their career choice.   
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Legal and Economic Institutions 
Finally, we asked questions bout the business climate and found that entrepreneurs are in 
general more optimistic than non entrepreneurs except for the clarity of tax rules (not the 
level of taxes!). However, responses to questions about the business climate were not 
very optimistic in general (Table 1e). Corruption and crime are viewed as serious 
problems. Entrepreneurs complained more about theft of property. They have a less 
positive view of central government and find more that that it creates obstacles for 
business. Trust in courts is much lower for entrepreneurs than for non entrepreneurs when 
it comes to defending oneself either against other businesses or against government 
(roughly less than 50 percent for entrepreneurs as compared to roughly two thirds for non 
entrepreneurs).  
 
Summary 
To summarize, there are some important differences between entrepreneurs and non 
entrepreneurs in Brazil. It seems that the most important difference relates to the social 
origins and the social environment of entrepreneurs. Parents of entrepreneurs have had 
positions of leadership in their job. There are significantly more entrepreneurs in the 
families of entrepreneurs and also among school and university friends.  
 
These differences were equally striking in the surveys in Russia and China. There are, 
however, also some differences. Risk-taking attitudes in Russia and especially in China 
were significantly higher among entrepreneurs compared to non entrepreneurs. Greed 
(not willing to retire because of money aspirations) seemed also to be driving 
entrepreneurs in Russia and China but not Brazil. The value of work also appeared to 
distinguish entrepreneurs more from non entrepreneurs in Russia and China. Brazilian 
entrepreneurs scored quite higher on cognitive scores which was not the case in China. 
Brazilian entrepreneurs exhibit more trust than non entrepreneurs, a characteristic which 
was not present in the other countries. However, the general level of trust in Brazil is not 
that high. Pessimism on institutions, especially relative to courts appears in Brazil to be 
higher than in China and comparable to Russia.  
 
3. Who Becomes an Entrepreneur? 
In this section, we report results of probit and multi-variate regression analysis on who 
becomes an entrepreneur (Table 2). All analyses control for age, gender and education 
(including a quadratic effect) and include city fixed effects. The first column is a probit 
regression. The main results that come out confirm the descriptive analysis in the 
previous section. The main effects are related to the social environment. Having a father 
as a boss or a director has a positive effect on becoming an entrepreneur and so is the fact 
of having entrepreneurs among relatives or friends. A lower education of the father has a 
positive effect. Among the personal characteristics, the cognitive score and height have a 
positive effect and so does greed. Risk-taking is not significant and achievement in 
education (above the 10% in the last place of study) is not either. We also used as 
regressors some birth-order variables but they are not significant.  
 
Column 2 presents OLS regression with the number of years as entrepreneur used as a 
dependent variable. The results are roughly the same except that fewer variables are 
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significant. The father’s position is again important and so are entrepreneurs among 
childhood friends and height. Greed is not significant and neither are entrepreneurs in the 
family. However, being the only child has a positive effect.  
 
Column 3 studies failed entrepreneurs, i.e. people who were once entrepreneurs but 
stopped their business. The results look similar to those we found for entrepreneurs but 
with a few differences. The most striking difference is a negative coefficient on risk-
taking, suggesting that failed entrepreneurs did not like risk. Greed also loses 
significance. These two results are exactly the same in China. This suggests that social 
networks certainly play a big role in the decision to become an entrepreneur but absence 
of risk-taking and greed are reasons to quit. Another important difference which we did 
not find in the case of China is that entrepreneurs have a higher cognitive score than non 
entrepreneurs whereas failed entrepreneurs do not. Failed entrepreneurs are thus less 
smart, less greedy and less risk-taking.   
 
Column 4 looks at non-entrepreneurs who thought seriously about becoming an 
entrepreneur but did not. The differences with entrepreneurs are again quite similar. The 
social network variables are all significant but cognitive score and greed are not 
significant and risk-taking has a negative coefficient. This mirrors our China results 
where we found the same differences except for the cognitive scores. Interestingly, in 
both countries, the characteristics of both failed entrepreneurs and of those who thought 
seriously about being an entrepreneur differ in the same way compared to entrepreneurs.  
 
Table 3 looks at the differences between entrepreneurs, failed entrepreneurs and non 
entrepreneurs using a multinomial logit framework. Again, having family and relatives 
run a business is higher among entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs and lower among 
non entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs tend to be greedier, which is not the case for failed 
entrepreneurs and non entrepreneurs. Failed entrepreneurs are less risk-taking.  We also 
introduce the distinction between entrepreneurs by opportunity and entrepreneurs by 
necessity. The former became business owners because they seized a business 
opportunity. They are the true entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense. The latter 
became business owners primarily because they lost their job or because of economic 
decline in their previous sector. What are the main differences we found? Entrepreneurs 
by opportunity do better on the cognitive score and have stronger family and social links 
to entrepreneurs. Fathers were also more often in a position of leadership. Taking into 
account the results of the Chinese and Russian survey however, we do not find a 
consistent pattern across countries when comparing these two groups.  
 
So far we have not provided a causal link between the social environment and the choice 
to become an entrepreneur. It could very well be that an unobserved variable affects both 
the choice of the individual and his parents and relatives to become an entrepreneur. In 
Table 4, we provide two stage least squares estimations of the entrepreneurship choice 
where we instrument entrepreneurship by the size of the father’s family. Indeed, size of 
the family of the father might affect his or his sibling’s choice to become an entrepreneur. 
A large family size may force children to fight more to survive and make them more 
likely to become entrepreneurs. According to psychologists and sociologists, family size 
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and birth order are said to influence one’s character and values (see e.g. Sulloway, 1997). 
It is also potentially a valid instrument as family size of the father is unlikely to have an 
affect on somebody’s choice to become an entrepreneur.  
 
The regressions we report use as “relative-entrepreneur” variable either a dummy 
variable for whether the father and his siblings are (or were) entrepreneur or a dummy 
variable for whether father or siblings are (or were) entrepreneur or self-employed. The 
instrument is the log of the size of the father’s family. To check for robustness, in 
columns 3 and 4 we exclude families with over 18 kids and in columns 5 and 6, we 
exclude families with over 14 lids and entrepreneurs who required initial financing (in 
order to eliminate any potential bequest motive which might invalidate the research 
design).  
 
In Table 5, we did the same exercise but with an instrumental variable probit maximum 
likelihood estimation. We see that the instrumented variable is significant in most 
specifications. The “Childhood friends entrepreneurs” variable remains strong while 
many of the other variables are less robust. Risk-taking is negative in some specifications 
but positive or not significant in others. A similar remark holds for the father’s position as 
boss or director. We conclude that there is a clear effect of family on the choice of 
becoming an entrepreneur.  
 
4. What makes a successful entrepreneur? 
 
The previous section looked at what affects the choice of becoming an entrepreneur. Now 
we raise a different question: what determines entrepreneurial success? The answer is 
provided in Table 6. The first two columns are regressions with sales growth. We asked 
entrepreneurs whether the sales growth in the previous year was negative, between 0 and 
5%, between 5 and 10% and so on. Here the findings are striking. The family and relative 
entrepreneur variables lose significance. The two main variables that play a positive role 
are school achievement (above 10% in the last place of study) and whether the father had 
a higher education or not. Note that inheritance of business is significant but has a 
negative coefficient.  
 
The interpretation of that coefficient is however less clear. It might reflect a higher initial 
size of business (which light thus grow less) but also less competence of the entrepreneur. 
Columns 3 and 4 measure success by using employment growth as an alternative 
dependent variable. Here the results are somewhat different. Businessmen among 
childhood friends and height are the two main positive variables. Since we have data on 
the number of employees when the business started, we used this as a regressor and the 
coefficient is negative.  
 
One might ask whether successful entrepreneurs have the special character trait of being 
overconfident relative to the rest of the population. We measured overconfidence in two 
ways. The first is the traditional one being used by psychologists. Respondents are asked 
to give a low and a high estimate of the length of the Nile river. Overconfident people 
tend to give very narrow intervals for the estimate. We also measured overconfidence 
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using our cognitive score results. We asked people to estimate whether their score would 
be below or above average. We thus ranked people in four categories depending on their 
score and their estimate of their score: high normal (above average and correctly 
guessing), low normal (below average and correctly guessing), high modest (above 
average but rating oneself below average) and low arrogant (below average but rating 
oneself above average). Our high modest types are underconfident while our low arrogant 
types are overconfident.  
 
The results for our dependent variables are shown in Table 7.1 The bold coefficient 
associated to “low arrogant” measures the effect of overconfidence (low normal is the 
omitted variable) whereas the bold coefficient associated to “high modest” measures the 
effect of under-confidence (high normal is the omitted variable). We also include the 
discount rate as a regressor. The first two columns show the probit results for becoming 
an entrepreneur. We find no significant effect for either overconfidence or under-
confidence. The only effect we are picking up is entrepreneurs having a higher cognitive 
score and being aware of it. The next two columns show probit regressions for failed 
entrepreneurs. We do not find a significant effect for overconfidence but find a negative 
coefficient associated to under-confidence which means that under-confident people are 
less likely to be found among failed entrepreneurs. The next two columns give OLS 
results for years as an entrepreneur. Here we find a negative and significant coefficient 
associated to overconfidence. This suggests that overconfidence is not good to stay in 
business. The last two columns give the clearest results. Here the dependent variable is 
sales growth which measures success as an entrepreneur. Here we find that both 
overconfidence and under-confidence have a negative effect on sales growth. We also 
find that a higher discount rate, i.e. a lower patience is negatively associated with sales 
growth. We conclude that overconfidence or under-confidence both play a negative role 
when it comes to determining success as an entrepreneur.  
 
5. Conclusions   
 
We report the results of a new survey on entrepreneurship in Brazil. The data are used to 
test three competing hypotheses on entrepreneurship: the role of economic and legal 
institutions (security of property rights; access to credit); the role of sociological 
characteristics (family background, social networks); and the role of individual features 
(attitude towards risk, I.Q., self-confidence) in becoming an entrepreneur. In line with our 
previous research in China and Russia, we find that sociological characteristics have the 
strongest influence on becoming an entrepreneur. In contrast, success as an entrepreneur 
is primarily determined by the individual’s smartness and higher education in the family. 
Entrepreneurs are not more self-confident than non-entrepreneurs; and overconfidence is 
bad for business success. 
                                                 
1 We used all the controls and variables showed in other tables but display here only the results on over- 
and under-confidence. 
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Table 1a. Personal characteristics of Brazilian entrepreneurs relative to  
non entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs 
 
 
  
Entrepre
neurs 
Non 
Entrepre
neurs 
 p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means  
Failed 
entrepre
neurs 
  p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means   
Born in rural area, % 24 09 0.00 *** 30 0.53  
Born in city or town, % 76 91 0.00 *** 70 0.53  
Number of localities lived in 2.65 2.30 0.04 ** 3.67 0.06 * 
Catholic, % 67 70 0.65  48 0.03 ** 
Protestant, % 15 09 0.02 ** 28 0.18  
Married, % 77 61 0.00 *** 46 0.00 *** 
Overweight, % 22 32 0.03 ** 18 0.71  
        
Was in top 10% in school, % 36 39 0.58  26 0.31  
Was in top 10% in high school, 
% 34 30 0.51  17 0.02 ** 
Was in top 10% in university, % 33 43 0.09 * 18 0.05 * 
Speaks foreign languages, % 29 19 0.05 ** 18 0.27  
        
Would participate in $10 or $20 
gamble, % 46 51 0.41  38 0.36  
Would participate in $20 
gamble, % 19 22 0.58  08 0.03 ** 
Would participate in 1 or 2 
percent of monthly income 
gamble, % 43 49 0.44  38 0.62  
Would participate in 2 percent 
of monthly income gamble, % 18 29 0.05 ** 15 0.52  
Discount rate, % 18 24 0.02 ** 16 0.76  
Hyperbolic discounting, % 62 59 0.70  44 0.09 * 
        
Overconfidence (by I.Q. test) 09 14 0.13  02 0.19  
Underconfidence (by I.Q. test) 29 24 0.36  20 0.27  
I.Q. score 2.86 2.44 0.04 ** 2.51 0.14  
Notes: *, **, *** Significance at the 10 %, 5%, 1% level. 
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Table 1b. Values of Brazilian entrepreneurs relative to  
non entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs 
 
  
Entrepre
neurs 
Non 
Entrepre
neurs 
 p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means  
Failed 
entrepren
eurs 
  p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means   
Retire if won 100 times GDP 
per capita, % 11 35 0.00 *** 17 0.24  
Retire if won 500 times GDP 
per capita, % 10 14 0.33  25 0.17  
Not retire because likes job, % 61 58 0.68  30 0.00 *** 
Not retire because wants more 
money, % 14 19 0.35  37 0.03 ** 
    
Friends are very important, % 63 68 0.40  79 0.00 *** 
Relations with parents are very 
important, % 83 77 0.07 * 91 0.09 * 
Education of children is very 
important, % 97 90 0.03 ** 98 0.41  
Financial well-being is very 
important, % 73 74 0.84  84 0.12  
Personal independence is very 
important, % 70 70 0.99  65 0.61  
Power is very important, % 18 14 0.29  13 0.52  
Religion is very important, % 54 45 0.08 * 46 0.42  
Work is very important, % 82 77 0.22  63 0.04 ** 
Intellectual achievement is very 
important, % 54 53 0.96  57 0.76  
Can justify to some degree 
avoiding a fare on transport, % 33 45 0.03 ** 39 0.44  
Can justify to some degree 
paying bribe to avoid 
regulations, % 09 -01 0.00 *** -02 0.03 ** 
Can justify to some degree 
paying bribe to avoid 
competition, % 03 02 0.72  02 0.55  
Can justify to some degree 
accepting a bribe, % 02 01 0.62  02 0.90  
Can justify to some degree 
buying stolen, % 01 06 0.31  01 0.03 ** 
Respect of others is very 
important for job satisfaction, % 55 70 0.03 ** 48 0.34  
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Table 1c. Trust of Brazilian entrepreneurs relative to  
non entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs 
 
  
Entrepre
neurs 
Non 
Entrepre
neurs 
 p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means  
Failed 
entrepren
eurs 
  p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means   
Most people can be trusted, % 10 05 0.02 ** 06 0.13  
a lot of trust in family members, 
% 74 75 0.63  60 0.13  
A lot of trust in friends, % 38 40 0.68  27 0.16  
A lot or some trust in 
colleagues, % 83 76 0.18  79 0.59  
A lot or some trust in 
businessmen, % 77 59 0.01 *** 67 0.31  
A lot or some trust in 
subordinates, % 93 80 0.00 *** 70 0.01 *** 
A lot or some trust in other 
people in town, % 69 53 0.04 ** 62 0.48  
A lot or some trust in 
compatriots, % 69 60 0.26  61 0.45  
A lot or some trust in 
foreigners, % 50 43 0.29  53 0.69  
A lot or some trust in local 
government, % 38 38 0.99  39 0.99  
A lot or some trust in regional 
government, % 39 37 0.78  37 0.85  
A lot or some trust in central 
government, % 32 32 0.97  35 0.81  
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Table 1d. Social characteristics of Brazilian entrepreneurs relative to  
non entrepreneurs and failed entrepreneurs 
 
  
Entrepre
neurs 
Non 
Entrepre
neurs 
 p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means  
Failed 
entrepren
eurs 
  p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means   
Father with higher or uncompleted 
higher education, % 13 17 0.31  19 0.43  
Father was director of organization 
or senior manager, % 54 18 0.00 *** 49 0.67  
Father was a worker, % 32 52 0.00 *** 37 0.58  
Father had 10 or more 
subordinates, % 26 12 0.00 *** 19 0.34  
Mother with higher or 
uncompleted higher education, % 09 10 0.72  00 0.00 *** 
Mother was director of 
organization or senior manager, % 27 03 0.00 *** 24 0.77  
Mother was a worker, % 44 57 0.07 * 50 0.58  
Mother had 10 or more 
subordinates, % 09 04 0.22  20 0.17  
Family wealth was above average 
at 16, % 17 11 0.09 * 24 0.56  
Family wealth was below average 
at 16, % 34 31 0.55  23 0.06 * 
Has relatives who are self-
employed, % 55 34 0.00 *** 53 0.85  
Number of relatives who are self-
employed 0.97 0.59 0.00 *** 1.03 0.77  
Has relatives who are 
businessmen, % 81 55 0.00 *** 77 0.52  
Number of relatives who are 
businessmen 2.05 0.99 0.00 *** 1.63 0.14  
Has relatives who have a business 
with 5 or more employees, % 77 60 0.10 * 76 0.95  
Number of relatives who have a 
business with 5 or more employees 1.28 0.46 0.00 *** 0.91 0.07 * 
Has school friends who are 
entrepreneurs, % 70 48 0.02 ** 67 0.77  
Number of school friends who are 
entrepreneurs, 1.44 0.64 0.00 *** 1.27 0.52  
Experience of school friends 
influenced career choice, % 04 03 0.80  09 0.09 * 
Has university friends who are 
entrepreneurs, % 78 33 0.00 *** 63 0.17  
Number of university friends who 
are entrepreneurs, 1.30 0.43 0.00 *** 0.63 0.00 *** 
Experience of university friends 
influenced career choice, % 07 08 0.95  12 0.32  
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Table 1e. Attitudes towards Economic and Legal Institutions 
 
  
Entrepre
neurs 
Non 
Entrepre
neurs 
 p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means  
Failed 
entrepren
eurs 
  p-value for 
test of 
difference in 
means   
Favorable attitude of population 
towards entrepreneurs, % 63 55 0.15  55 0.31  
A very serious problem for 
small businesses: 
- taxes , % 74 71 0.61  70 0.58  
- tax rules, % 70 61 0.09 * 71 0.89  
- competition, % 21 34 0.01 ** 35 0.19  
- poor courts, % 66 69 0.73  73 0.58  
- difficulties of raising finance , 
% 49 64 0.01 *** 64 0.20  
- administrative regulations , % 46 66 0.01 *** 58 0.43  
- corruption , % 80 84 0.44  79 0.82  
- crime , % 84 85 0.85  78 0.17  
- nontransparent "rules-of-
game", % 60 71 0.06 * 77 0.11  
Courts function fairly well, % 46 38 0.14  51 0.56  
Banks function fairly well, % 74 71 0.58  79 0.45  
Police functions fairly well, % 54 47 0.30  68 0.08 * 
Government functions fairly 
well, % 50 61 0.04 ** 53 0.71  
Government does not hamper 
business, % 45 61 0.01 *** 61 0.08 * 
Entrepreneurs often pay bribes 
to avoid complying with 
regulations, % 48 63 0.01 ** 60 0.34  
Entrepreneurs often pay bribes 
to change rules of running 
business, % 44 60 0.01 ** 62 0.10  
Entrepreneurs are often subject 
to theft of property, % 66 55 0.03 ** 43 0.05 ** 
Entrepreneurs are often subject 
to rackets, % 41 59 0.00 *** 41 0.99  
Entrepreneurs can protect 
themselves in courts against 
business relations, % 47 71 0.00 *** 70 0.00 *** 
Entrepreneurs can protect 
themselves in courts against 
government, % 42 67 0.00 *** 56 0.11  
Notes: *, **, *** Significance at the 10 %, 5%, 1% level. 
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Table 2. Who becomes an entrepreneur 
 
dependent variable Entrepreneur Years as 
entrepreneur, OLS 
Was an 
entrepreneur  
Thought about  
being an  
entrepreneur  
Father had higher 
education 
-0.00365 -0.07741 0.07916 -0.19272 
 [0.01]** [0.61] [0.39] [0.01]** 
Father was a boss or 
director 
0.00782 0.65475 0.05852 -0.16687 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.48] [0.08]* 
Mother was a boss or 
director 
0.00558 0.18247 -0.02959 0.04036 
 [0.12] [0.60] [0.83] [0.81] 
Members of family 
running a business 
0.00501 0.13377 0.18318 0.14553 
 [0.00]*** [0.36] [0.02]** [0.05]** 
Childhood friends running 
a business 
0.0115 0.65302 0.17379 0.17751 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Cognitive score 0.00109 -0.02284 -0.03849 -0.0286 
 [0.01]*** [0.68] [0.30] [0.34] 
Height (cm) 0.00023 0.01412 -0.00245 -0.01374 
 [0.01]*** [0.07]* [0.70] [0.06]* 
Risk-taking (relative 
income gamble) 
-0.00033 -0.04245 -0.1102 -0.17219 
 [0.81] [0.76] [0.05]** [0.09]* 
Above 10% in last place 
of study 
0.00036 0.06752 0.12828 0.10589 
 [0.76] [0.65] [0.05]** [0.24] 
Greed  0.0021 0.1499 -0.02765 0.04367 
 [0.04]** [0.14] [0.70] [0.69] 
first child -0.00009 0.29943 0.08069 -0.05846 
 [0.95] [0.11] [0.17] [0.72] 
last child -0.00163 0.30018 0.13474 0.25663 
 [0.25] [0.16] [0.29] [0.08]* 
only child -0.00292 0.63648 0.41884 -0.03947 
 [0.19] [0.05]* [0.02]** [0.88] 
log number of siblings -0.00184 0.04119 0.0475 0.00492 
 [0.19] [0.73] [0.56] [0.97] 
Observations 671 742 436 276 
R-squared  0.08   
Note: Robust p values in brackets. All regressions control for age, gender, education and education squared 
and have city fixed effects. 
Dependent variable Entrepreneur Failed Entrepreneur Non 
 Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur  
By opportunity 
Entrepreneur 
By necessity 
Non  
Entrepreneur 
Father had higher education -0.00268 0.07217 -0.06949 -0.00313 -0.00013 0.00327 
 [0.20]     [0.44] [0.46] [0.03]** [0.61] [0.03]**
Father was a boss or director 0.00477 0.05929 -0.06405 0.00278 0.00041 -0.00319 
 [0.00]***   [0.47] [0.44] [0.01]*** [0.10] [0.01]***
Mother was a boss or director -0.00114 -0.02873 0.02987 0.00017 0.00055 -0.00073 
 [0.51]    [0.84] [0.83] [0.90] [0.12] [0.66]
Members of family running a business 0.00641 0.19565 -0.20206 0.00465 0.00066 -0.00531 
 [0.00]***     [0.03]** [0.02]** [0.04]** [0.18] [0.03]**
Childhood friends running a business 0.0075 0.16747 -0.17496 0.00483 0.00061 -0.00544 
 [0.00]***     [0.02]** [0.01]** [0.00]*** [0.10]* [0.00]***
Cognitive score       0.00081 -0.03792 0.0371 0.00068 0.00011 -0.00079
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Table 3 Multinomial logit analysis of entrepreneurship 
 
      [0.15] [0.33] [0.34] [0.06]* [0.27] [0.05]*
Height (cm)       0.00017 -0.00265 0.00249 0.00016 0.00005 -0.0002
 [0.07]*      [0.69] [0.71] [0.11] [0.06]* [0.05]*
Risk-taking (relative income gamble) -0.00019 -0.11532 0.11551 -0.00097 -0.00027 0.00123 
 [0.88]    [0.05]** [0.05]** [0.46] [0.17] [0.33]
Above 10% in last place of study      0.00091 0.12984 -0.13076 0.00083 0.00023 -0.00107
 [0.53]    [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.34] [0.36] [0.30]
Greed        0.00518 -0.03115 0.02597 0.00104 0.00013 -0.00118
     [0.00]*** [0.67] [0.73] [0.22] [0.49] [0.16]
first child 0.00169 0.0752 -0.07689 0.0012 -0.00027 -0.00093 
     [0.25] [0.18] [0.18] [0.22] [0.37] [0.41]
last child       -0.00052 0.13114 -0.13062 -0.00024 -0.00027 0.00051
     [0.78] [0.28] [0.29] [0.83] [0.46] [0.70]
only child 0.00042 0.36853 -0.36896 -0.00396 -0.00067 0.00463 
     [0.93] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.10]* [0.37] [0.08]*
log number of siblings -0.00083 0.03881 -0.03798 -0.00007 -0.00015 0.00022 
 [0.62]    [0.64] [0.64] [0.95] [0.60] [0.87]
Observations       788 788 788 589 589 589
Note: Robust p values in brackets. All regressions control for age, gender, education and education squared and have city fixed effects.
 
Table 4 Two stage least square estimation of entrepreneurship 
  
Father or siblings entrepreneur 0.0948  0.1216  0.0376  
 [1.57]  [2.16]**  [1.84]*  
Father or siblings entrepreneur or   0.1635  0.1765  0.0459 
Self-employed  [1.66]*  [1.70]*  [1.86]* 
Father had higher education -0.0091 -0.001 -0.0073 0.0048 -0.0035 -0.0011 
 [0.71] [0.05] [0.51] [0.23] [0.48] [0.13] 
Father was a boss or director -0.0122 -0.0282 -0.0284 -0.035 -0.0002 0.0013 
 [0.45] [0.67] [0.97] [0.73] [0.02] [0.09] 
Mother was a boss or director -0.0074 -0.0227 -0.0121 -0.0244 0.0041 0.0026 
 [0.37] [0.67] [0.53] [0.65] [0.37] [0.20] 
Childhood friends running a business 0.0379 0.0268 0.037 0.0263 0.0146 0.0122 
 [3.30]*** [1.64] [2.85]*** [1.43] [2.74]*** [1.89]* 
Cognitive score 0.0051 0.0048 0.0055 0.0055 0.0015 0.0015 
 [1.32] [1.28] [1.30] [1.38] [0.86] [0.99] 
Height (cm) 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 [1.27] [1.22] [0.77] [0.20] [0.67] [0.44] 
Risk-taking (relative income gamble) -0.019 -0.0261 -0.0243 -0.0259 -0.0064 -0.0055 
 [1.74]* [1.41] [2.11]** [1.38] [1.32] [1.05] 
Above 10% in last place of study -0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0071 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0014 
 [0.56] [0.11] [0.68] [0.20] [0.47] [0.26] 
Greed  0.0081 0.0055 0.0087 0.0068 0.0042 0.0042 
 [0.79] [0.56] [0.69] [0.66] [0.80] [0.95] 
first child -0.0117 -0.0191 -0.0125 -0.0175 -0.0016 -0.0016 
 [0.79] [1.05] [0.83] [1.07] [0.27] [0.30] 
last child -0.0124 -0.019 -0.017 -0.0216 -0.0041 -0.0042 
 [0.68] [0.79] [0.88] [0.93] [0.52] [0.57] 
Only child 0.0213 -0.0141 0.0269 -0.0305 0.015 -0.0012 
 [1.39] [0.33] [1.58] [0.57] [2.03]** [0.08] 
Observations 611 611 605 605 382 382 
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Table 5 Instrumental variable probit estimation (maximum likelihood)  
of entrepreneurship 
 
Father or siblings 
entrepreneur 
1.845  2.074  1.797  
 [0.641]***  [0.415]***  [0.802]**  
Father or siblings 
entrepreneur or  
 2.17  2.22  1.949 
self-employed  [0.347]***  [0.297]***  [0.670]*** 
Father had higher 
education 
-0.063 -0.03 -0.106 -0.123 -0.089 0.184 
 [0.059] [0.062] [0.067] [0.075] [0.073] [0.319] 
Father was a boss or 
director 
-0.354 -0.427 0.516 0.393 0.5 0.377 
 [0.513] [0.053]*** [0.075]*** [0.405] [0.783] [0.062]*** 
Mother was a boss or 
director 
-0.108 0.258 0.283 0.265 0.056 0.286 
 [0.363] [0.333] [0.327] [0.083]*** [0.087]*** [0.092]*** 
Childhood friends 
running a business 
-0.003 0.067 -0.003 0.059 -0.023 0.329 
 [0.075] [0.298] [0.269]** [0.304] [0.354] [0.427] 
Cognitive score 0.124 0.089 -0.026 0.096 0.098 0.089 
 [0.020] [0.053]* [0.020] [0.019] [0.024] [0.024] 
Height (cm) 0 0.013 0.003 0 0.004 0.002 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.005] [0.016] 
Risk-taking (relative 
income gamble) 
0.185 -0.311 -0.361 -0.292 -0.194 0.123 
 [0.053]*** [0.143]** [0.137]*** [0.131]** [0.304] [0.052]** 
Above 10% in last place 
of study 
0.031 0.068 -0.01 -0.033 0.11 -0.048 
 [0.063] [0.157] [0.156] [0.062] [0.204] [0.063] 
Greed  0.057 0.049 0.116 0.082 0.037 0.088 
 [0.186] [0.149] [0.061] [0.143] [0.217] [0.187] 
first child -0.217 -0.207 0.213 0.159 -0.215 0.174 
 [0.095]** [0.099]* [0.345] [0.106] [0.112] [0.120] 
last child 0.169 0.17 0.181 0.139 0.143 -0.239 
 [0.144] [0.146] [0.148] [0.150] [0.275] [0.156] 
Only child -0.001 -0.097 0.166 -0.499 -0.736 -0.501 
 [0.107] [0.220] [0.134] [0.247] [0.254] [0.254] 
chi2-test:  (instrument) 19.43 3.02 15.79 3.15 15.15 4.64 
p-value 0 0.08 0 0.08 0 .03 
Observations 611 611 605 605 382 382 
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Table 6 Characteristics of successful entrepreneurs 
 
Dependent variable Sales growth  Sales growth  Employment 
growth 
Employment 
growth 
Father had higher 
education 
0.25552 0.31329 -0.09831 -0.0531 
 [0.07]* [0.06]* [0.47] [0.71] 
Father was a boss or 
director 
-0.07674 -0.11056 0.18436 0.17107 
 [0.63] [0.41] [0.16] [0.20] 
Mother was a boss or 
director 
-0.08822 -0.00887 0.00682 0.00506 
 [0.66] [0.96] [0.97] [0.98] 
Members of family 
running a business 
-0.11103 -0.10689 0.07799 0.04392 
 [0.68] [0.70] [0.63] [0.79] 
Childhood friends 
running a business 
0.20469 0.20246 0.28772 0.26563 
 [0.20] [0.22] [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Cognitive score 0.04286 0.05562 -0.00829 -0.00218 
 [0.45] [0.33] [0.81] [0.94] 
Height (cm) 0.00405 0.00537 0.01229 0.01109 
 [0.43] [0.38] [0.01]*** [0.01]** 
Risk-taking (relative 
income gamble) 
-0.12937 -0.12704 -0.0585 -0.0466 
 [0.21] [0.27] [0.77] [0.80] 
Above 10% in last 
place of study 
0.45975 0.3846 0.10012 0.06657 
 [0.00]*** [0.01]** [0.40] [0.58] 
Greed  0.09043 0.12644 0.11007 0.12934 
 [0.54] [0.34] [0.15] [0.10]* 
first child  0.4748  0.39762 
  [0.08]*  [0.12] 
last child  0.19051  0.46626 
  [0.40]  [0.03]** 
only child  0.10177  0.70951 
  [0.75]  [0.15] 
log number of 
siblings 
 0.33792  0.124 
  [0.02]**  [0.40] 
inherited the business -0.44697 -0.41481 -0.42109 -0.44436 
 [0.02]** [0.05]* [0.24] [0.21] 
Business size at start   -0.77875 -0.76672 
   [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
Observations 348 347 353 352 
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.47 0.49 
Note: Robust p values in brackets.  
Table 7 Over-and under-confidence and discounting 
 
 Entrepreneurs
relative to 
non 
entrepreneurs 
 Entrepreneurs 
relative to 
non 
entrepreneurs 
Failed 
entrepreneurs 
Failed 
entrepreneurs  
Years as 
entrepreneur, 
OLS,  
Years as 
entrepreneur, 
OLS,  
Sales 
growth  
Sales 
growth  
Discount rate -0.00084 -0.00084 -0.02417 -0.02417 -0.16931 -0.16931 -0.31305 -0.31305 
 [0.35]    [0.35] [0.36] [0.36] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.00]*** [0.00]***
Overconfidence 
(Nile interval) 
-0.00055       -0.00055 0.02862 0.02862 -0.04618 -0.04618 -0.00078 -0.00078
 [0.73]        [0.73] [0.72] [0.72] [0.76] [0.76] [1.00] [1.00]
Low arrogant -0.00097 -0.00286 -0.00457 -0.04605 -0.43179 -0.41523 -0.6391 -0.94297 
 [0.57] [0.01]*** [0.97] [0.77] [0.00]*** [0.12] [0.08]* [0.01]** 
High modest 0.00425 0.00022 -0.13119 -0.16811 -0.22797 -0.21141 -0.08812 -0.39199 
 [0.18] [0.92] [0.32] [0.07]* [0.31] [0.45] [0.72] [0.05]** 
Low normal  -0.00308  -0.04264  0.01656  -0.30387 
        [0.03]** [0.72] [0.94] [0.10]
High normal 0.00448  0.04364  -0.01656  0.30387  
 [0.03]**       [0.72] [0.94] [0.10]
Inherited 
business 
       -0.59174 -0.59174
       [0.01]*** [0.01]***
Observations 545      545 361 361 605 605 280 280 
R-squared         0.09 0.09 0.23 0.23
Robust p values in brackets        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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